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Abstract
This chapter discusses the relevance of economics to the study of animal welfare.  It considers the relationship between ethics and economics and emphasises that economics is primarily about the attainment of human well-being.  It considers both conventional and alternative economic thinking and the relevance of economics to policy decisions about animal welfare, and can offer insights into the costs and benefits of animal exploitation. Economic frameworks for analysis are presented, together with some assessment of their use and the implications for policy.  The role of governments is considered and policy options and instruments for addressing questions relating to animal welfare in society are identified, including voluntary vs mandatory standards and welfare labelling of food products. A brief review of studies to measure people’s willingness to pay for animal welfare is presented. Such studies can be used to better evaluate policy measures intended to improve animal welfare. Economic considerations are central to the animal welfare debate and are integral (and inescapable) aspects of issues concerning the use of animals and of any interdisciplinary inquiry into animal welfare and should help us to make better decisions concerning human use of, and obligations to, animals.

17.1. Introduction
In many people’s minds economics is perhaps synonymous with accountancy and with the importance of monetary considerations. Indeed, when asking students new to the study of economics what they think economics is about they usually mention money at the outset. However, money is merely employed by economists as a useful measuring rod of people’s preferences and accountancy is primarily concerned with the presentation of financial information. In contrast, economics, which grew out of the study of moral philosophy, tries to address much broader issues that are central concerns of society. Indeed, Sen (1987) states that economics can help us address the important question of ‘how we should live’. More expansively, Alfred Marshall wrote (in 1890: see Marshall, 1947, pp1, 22, 39) that:
Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing ... Money is a means towards ends ... and is sought as a means to all kinds of ends, high as well as low, spiritual as well as material ... Thus though it is true that “money” or “general purchasing power” or “command over material wealth”, is the centre around which economic science clusters; this is so, not because money or material wealth is regarded as the main aim of human effort, nor even as affording the main subject matter for the study of the economist, but because in this world of ours it is the one convenient means of measuring human motive on a large scale ... But with careful precautions money affords a fairly good measure of the moving force of a great part of the motives by which men’s lives are fashioned ...  Economics has a great and an increasing concern in motives connected with ... the collective pursuit of important aims. Economics has then as its purpose ... to throw light on practical issues. 

Amongst these practical issues Marshall raises that of ‘those who suffer the evil, but do not reap the good’ and poses the question ‘how far is it right that they should suffer for the benefit of others?’ Although Marshall was referring to human society, this question is surely central to the study of animal welfare.
However, although the ethical and scientific aspects of animal welfare and animal rights have been extensively debated over the last fifty years (Harrison, 1964; Singer, 1975, 1980; Regan, 1982, 1984), the relevance of economic considerations has received relatively little attention. This is despite some early initial economic thinking regarding the economic relationships between animals and humans. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1790, part II, sec. III, chap. 1, para. 4), the ‘founding father’ of economics, succinctly noted the economic relationship between animals and humans by writing ‘Animals are not only the causes of pleasure and pain, but are also capable of feeling those sensations.’ The relevance of animals feeling pleasure and pain in relation to economics – a discipline fundamentally concerned with human welfare and not that of other species – becomes clearer given that Smith (1790, part I, sec. I, chap. 1, para. 1) also wrote: 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness necessary to him though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.

Clearly, ‘others’ in this context may include non-human animals as well as humans. Bentham (1789) explicitly included human benevolence and sympathy to animals amongst his categorization of (human) ‘pleasures’. The utilitarian ethic of weighing up pleasures and pain (benefits and costs) underlies the discipline of economics. This is perhaps most tangibly evident in cost-benefit analysis, a cornerstone of applied economics, which itself has been described as the ‘economic ethic’ (Boulding, 1969). 
Although there have been some specific studies over the last two decades or so, economists have not fully come to terms with animal welfare as a topic for theoretical or applied research. One explanation for this may be found in the assumption that animal welfare and how humans treat animals are moral issues. A second explanation is that animal health and welfare are seen as technical issues for animal and veterinary scientists to address, where what is good or bad for animals involve matters of fact concerning relative states of veterinary health or cognitive well-being. Given this conceptualization of animal welfare some may find the thought that monetary aspects should be taken into consideration as antithetical to the goal of acting in an ethical manner and/or that economic considerations are secondary or even irrelevant. How can we put a price on animal suffering? At the same time, if animal welfare is defined as an ethical problem, scientifically inclined economists will be quickly dissuaded from undertaking any research on it at all. 
However, regulations on human use of animals have obvious economic implications. It is relatively straightforward (though as we will discuss, potentially controversial) to apply standard concepts in economic theory to quantify certain elements of these implications. Thus there have been several studies to estimate the economic impact of regulations intended to improve farm animal welfare. For example, Bennett (1997) and Bennett and Blaney (2003) estimated people’s willingness to pay for legislation to ban the use of cages in egg production in Europe and weighed these against the higher industry costs of production, whilst Carlsson et al. (2007) undertook a similar exercise in relation to livestock slaughter facilities in Sweden. Sumner et al. (2008) estimated how animal-welfare promoting regulations in California would affect the cost of production for producers, concluding that California producers would no longer be competitive with producers from other states and the associated impact on the California economy. Defra (2017) reported a study of costs and benefits associated with EU broiler legislation in England and Wales, with costs of the legislation estimated by means of a survey of producers and benefits based on a contingent valuation study of citizens. It is possible to conduct similar studies on the impact of animal welfare regulations in medical research, zoos, keeping of companion animals and wildlife conservation. 
Such studies are generally intended as decision aids. FAWC (2011) notes that ‘economics is useful in providing a number of quantitative measures that can be used as evidence to support policy decisions … and in explaining the underlying economic forces behind such outcomes.’ Cost and benefit estimates derived from studies such as those cited above are often used to help voters or political decision makers make decisions about using resources to achieve the things that we want (such as improvements to animal welfare). The central problem for society, as economics conceives it, is that we all want a multitude of different things, but the resources that can be deployed in satisfying those wants are limited. As a society we cannot have everything that we want. This leaves us with three important and interrelated decisions: 1) What social outcomes should be pursued in allocating resources (i.e. What do we want)?  2) What allocation of resources produces the best or optimal mix of possible outcomes (i.e. What should we do)? And finally, 3) How are the costs and benefits of these outcomes distributed (i.e. Who wins, and who loses?). These questions have their roots in ethics, and the discipline of economics has evolved through a persistent attempt to clarify the questions and to bring data and rigorous analysis to bear on how to answer them.

17.2. Perspectives on economic analysis
One philosophical assumption followed by many economists sees each of the above questions as straightforward questions of fact, and construes economic science as an empirical inquiry that succeeds to the extent that it produces an accurate description or measure of the factual matters implicit in each question. Thus, although the question of what we should want (for example, in terms of the welfare of animals) may be inherently ethical, the question of what agents in society (e.g. consumers) do in fact want (or prefer) might be inferred by careful observation of their behaviour. Although the question of which policy choices should be made is inherently political, it may be possible to estimate which policies most closely approximate outcomes consistent with the preferences of individuals as evidenced in their behaviour. In addition, it may be possible to provide accounting of winners and losers by identifying which parties’ preferences are satisfied by the policy outcome.  Given this orientation, economics can be understood as the development of methods that model these social facts (e.g. preferences with regards to animal welfare) through the study of economic behaviour (e.g. people’s expenditure on ‘animal welfare friendly’ products or how much they donate to animal welfare causes).
Economists who have conducted their researches under the influence of this philosophical paradigm have been careful to note limitations in their ability to provide adequate models from observable economic behaviour. Early theoretical models made a number of implausible assumptions on the way to inferring that actual choice behaviour reveals the preference of an economic agent: for example, agents were assumed to act rationally and with full information (which for an emotive issue such as animal welfare with substantial information deficiencies is unlikely to be the case). Despite these acknowledged limitations, a number of factors have combined to make this conceptualization of economics into a seductive one. For politicians in democracies, the prospect of aligning policy with outcomes that maximize the number of individuals enjoying benefits is especially attractive. Indeed, Norwood and Lusk (2011, p197) argue that as economists they “lend a voice to the average citizen” by applying consumer willingness-to-pay for animal welfare to inform policy. Also, the scientific and empirical orientation towards these questions has allowed economists themselves to assume a position of impersonal authority. The combined effect of these factors is that admittedly incomplete economic models have had substantial influence on the resolution of inherently ethical and political issues without seeming to take on subjective or contestable ethical positions.
Yet in addition to implausible assumptions, studies of economic behaviour generally involve a number of additional value commitments, often implicit within the property rights, legal rules and history of accumulation associated with the status quo (e.g. the prevailing status of different species in society). It is thus possible to question whether putatively scientific studies based on economic behaviour ever transcend the normative commitments implied by the accretion of custom, law and accumulated wealth or influence inherent in any given characterization of the status quo. In other words, in the context of animal welfare, for example, conventional economic analyses of animal welfare policy, and the results that flow from them, are themselves largely a result of the status quo regarding current human-animal relations, institutional arrangements etc. 
It is in recognition of this situation that Daniel Bromley proposed a more pragmatic interpretation of the capabilities and orientation of economics. For Bromley, the status quo is always shaped by both formal and informal economic institutions: the legal rules that govern exchange and contracts and behavioural tendencies reflective of custom and existing distributions of status, wealth and social influence. In this connection, Bromley notes that any given status quo will be diversely regarded as satisfactory or problematic by different interests within society. For example, certain livestock production methods may be generally accepted by farmers but rejected by some consumers. Economics can provide a service by helping individuals and social decision makers gain a clearer grasp of the likely consequences of political action or policy change. Nevertheless, Bromley argues, it can be quite misleading to present these outcomes within a larger framework of social costs or benefits. To characterize an outcome as a cost or benefit is to imply an ethical value judgment that may well be contestable (Bromley, 2006).

17.3. Economic perspectives on animal welfare
Both conventional economic science and a pragmatic approach to economic institutions can be extended to the issue of animal welfare. From the mainstream approach, the task of economics is to model facts derived from a conceptualization of economic behaviour. From this perspective, it is logically possible to imagine the health and cognitive well-being of non-humans as being one aspect of the outcomes flowing from collective behaviour of economic agents transacting for personal gain. The utilitarian ethics of Peter Singer, for example, approximates a conventional economic approach by postulating the relative satisfaction or suffering of animals as being among the outcomes given consideration in computing the optimal mix or allocation of satisfaction, of benefit and cost (Singer, 1993), although few economists have directly incorporated the satisfaction of animals themselves in their utilitarian analyses (see Blackorby and Donaldson, 1992 for a rare example). It has been far more typical for economists to presume that these animals do not themselves evince any specifically economic behaviour, although some non-economist researchers have applied economic concepts to the study of animal behaviour, such as Dawkins (1990) in her application of consumer demand theory to measuring animal preferences. As such, economists are likely to presume that any economic analysis of animal interests must be reflected in the economic behaviour of human beings. McInerney (1994, pp13-14), for example writes:
Animal welfare is just a subset of man’s perception of his own welfare, and only indirectly to do with what is good for animals. There should be no surprise, therefore, that the welfare standards a society pursues are a coincidental outcome of its primary concern – the pursuit of human welfare ... In economic terms animals are no more than resources employed in economic processes which generate benefits for people.

This perspective also receives philosophical support from Jeremy Bentham’s assertion (1789, chap. XVII, para. 6) that animals ‘stand degraded into the class of things.’ From this perspective, the fact that animals may suffer in the process of producing goods and services for humans becomes a (regrettable) side-effect of the production system. Economists often refer to such indirect effects as ‘externalities’ (environmental pollution is another example of such an externality). Within this framework, animal welfare matters only because of human sensibilities toward animal suffering which affect human welfare. Thus, those that feel empathy with animals, may feel pain (or pleasure) associated with their perception that animals are unnecessarily suffering (or experiencing wellbeing), which reduces (or increases) their human welfare (utility) and so imposes a cost on them and, where a number of individuals are so affected, on society as a whole.
Arguably, concerns over poor animal welfare are determined entirely by people’s perceptions of animal suffering and how they interpret what they see or measure in terms of animal behaviour, changes in physiological processes etc. People’s perceptions are likely, therefore, to depend on the degree of anthropomorphism or reference to human suffering (Mason and Mendl, 1993; Sandøe and Simonsen, 1992). Perceptions are related to what people consider to be necessary or unnecessary, acceptable or unacceptable uses of animals which depend, in turn, on the perceived feasible alternatives (alternative production systems, products etc.) available. For example, many people may feel that the slaughter of farm animals is necessary and acceptable (although they may recognise that some animal suffering will be involved even with ‘humane’ methods) because they see no other alternative if they are to continue to eat meat. However, these same individuals may consider cage egg production unacceptable because they see a more acceptable alternative in the form of free range systems. Others may feel that all farm animal production systems are unacceptable and find acceptable non-animal alternative products to consume. It is clear that these perceptions are influenced by a host of factors ranging from cultural practices to aspects of lifestyle and revolve around people’s awareness about current uses of animals and alternatives to them.




17.4. Economic analysis and animal welfare – weighing costs and benefits
Economists use markets and market prices as a basis of values for both benefits and costs. However, they recognise that this can be problematic because markets do not necessarily reflect the true values of things to people in society. This is because (i) market prices only reflect the value of things that are exchanged through those markets and only reflect the preferences of people participating in markets, so there may be indirect costs and benefits (‘externalities’) which are not represented by market prices, (ii) market prices may be distorted in some way – for example, by government subsidies or taxation and (iii) market prices reflect marginal values not total values (i.e. we, as consumers, pay less than we would be willing to pay for the total amount of any product that we consume). Thus, we cannot rely solely on market prices for information on the value that we place on something in society. This means that economists must sometimes use other means of valuing benefits and costs.
The negative animal welfare externalities (i.e. animal suffering) associated with the production of animal products and services do not explicitly feature in the markets for animal products and so remain as hidden costs. An important aspect of these externalities is that the preferences of people not buying goods in markets are not considered. For example, consider the market for veal produced by keeping calves in crates. The preferences of people that consume veal are recorded in terms of the quantity they are willing to buy and the price they are willing to pay. But there may be people in society who experience considerable disquiet about the use of calves in this way which reduces their (human) welfare and so imposes a cost on them (and hence, within a cost-benefit analysis framework, on society). These people have no way of expressing their wants through the market system (although may do so in other ways such as actively protesting). Even people who consume veal may not be entirely happy with how it is produced and would prefer that an alternative method were used, but they can only express their feelings by not buying veal, assuming they are not offered a more ‘calf-friendly’ alternative. In addition, animal welfare externalities display characteristics that economists associate with what they term ‘public goods’ (sometimes referred to as ‘collective consumption goods’). These are goods that display two main characteristics: (i) once produced they can be consumed by many people in society without exclusion and (ii) one person’s consumption of the good is largely unaffected by another’s. Thus, improvements to animal welfare, brought about for example by changes in animal husbandry practices, can benefit any number of citizens who care about animal welfare and it is not really possible to exclude citizens from enjoying these benefits (similarly, the knowledge that animals are suffering will impose a cost on all such citizens). Those that consume products from animals with an improved welfare status may gain additional benefit in terms of their perception that they are directly contributing to better welfare through their purchase of the good, or through enhanced product quality etc.
Because markets only take account of the preferences of a subset (perhaps a minority) of people in society, they fail to allocate resources in a socially optimal way that maximizes the net benefit to society as a whole. Moreover, because of the public good nature of animal welfare, producers and others with commercial interests cannot exclude people from enjoying some of the benefits of improved animal welfare for free (i.e. they are unable to charge them and profit accordingly) and so may lack economic incentive to improve animal welfare. Again, the economic argument is that the costs associated with such animal welfare externalities should be taken into account in making decisions about the use of animals. A formal economic analysis of how economics might address this issue is provided by Bennett (1995) and only the main argument of that analysis is presented here.
This has some important implications for policies toward animal welfare. A conventional approach in economics raises two major questions. How can we estimate the optimum level of animal exploitation and how might we best ensure that this level is actually achieved? Figure 17.1 shows a likely relationship between production of animal goods and services (food products, companionship, research benefits etc.) and animal welfare. There is an important role here for animal scientists to help define this relationship for different animal uses. The relationship in Figure 17.1 assumes that up to a point (i.e. from A to B) animals and humans may derive mutual benefit from their association (although some may question this assumption, even for companion animals). Thus point B marks a relationship of maximum welfare for animals with some important benefits for the human species. However, this does not maximize the output of animal products for human benefit. This would be achieved at point D but at a cost to the welfare of animals. If humans exploited animals beyond this point their welfare would be so affected that they would no longer be efficient producers of food and other products and services, and hence operating beyond D would be highly inefficient (and irrational). The decision for society is where on the curve between B and D should we be? No doubt animals would prefer point B, whereas a human society uncaring about the welfare of animals (unless it affects production) would prefer point D. Arguably, within society at present, we might be operating at a point such as C. This implicitly gives a relative value to the welfare of animals (shown by the slope of the tangent at C which is –pAP/pAW, where pAP is the implicit price of animal products and pAW the implicit price of animal welfare), since it implies that, as a society, we would be unwilling to forgo a unit of animal product to gain an additional unit of animals’ welfare (or vice versa). Effectively then, society is placing an implicit value on animal suffering. However, we may feel that point C does not accurately reflect people’s concerns for animal welfare and perhaps if we knew society’s true preferences – shown by the societal indifference curve – then we should rather be at point X which gives a greater implicit value to animal welfare relative to animal products than at point C (i.e. a lower level of output of animal products but higher level of animal welfare). At point X, the ratio of the marginal cost of production of animal goods to the marginal cost of animal welfare is equal to the ratio of the marginal utility (i.e. benefit to society at this point) of production of animal goods to society’s marginal utility of animal welfare. From an economic theoretical viewpoint, this is an optimal position (of production of animal products and levels of animal welfare) that maximises the net benefit to society.
Figure 17.2 shows a further orthodox economic theoretical analysis of the optimal use of animals in society. The curve labelled TSB shows the total social benefits from consumption of increasing our use of animals to produce food etc. (labelled as ‘animal exploitation’). As we increase our use of animals and so produce, and consume, more food and other animal products so our benefit increases. The benefits of consumption of animal products can be estimated from information concerning people’s willingness to pay for those products in markets. The line TPC denotes the total private cost of production/consumption; in other words, how much it costs (in terms of the money value of resources, as estimated in the studies discussed in the very first section of the paper) to produce a particular quantity of animal products. The direct costs of production of animal products can also be estimated according to the value of resources needed to produce them. The difference between the two is the net benefit to be derived from consumption, which is maximised at Q level of exploitation of animals (i.e. the greatest difference between TSB and TPC). The line labelled MSB is the marginal social benefit associated with the TSB. It is, in fact, a consumer demand function which shows how much consumers are willing to pay, in aggregate, for different quantities of animal products denoted by the level of animal exploitation. The line MPC is the marginal private cost associated with production/consumption and forms the producer supply function. It can be seen that maximum net benefit is achieved where MSB = MPC which is where the two lines cross and where demand equals supply and the market is said to be in equilibrium (i.e. where the quantity of animal products produced equals the quantity bought by consumers). This equilibrium would be achieved in the market at price p. However, point Q is not the optimum level of animal exploitation for society. This is because the externality costs of animal use have not been taken into account. If these were to be adequately taken into account then the true costs of animal exploitation would be represented by line TSC instead of TPC. This means that a lower level of animal exploitation/production of animal products – shown by point Q’ – now maximises net benefit and this is the true optimum level of animal exploitation. The corresponding marginal cost curve of MSC (marginal social cost) shows that this level of animal exploitation would be achieved in the market at price p’ (which is higher than the former price, p). There are two main implications that follow from this simple analysis. The first is that unless we take account of the animal welfare externalities associated with animal use we will over-exploit animals and reduce the net benefit for society that could be achieved. Again, the role of animal welfare science in measuring the extent of these externalities for animals is critical. Secondly, to achieve this optimum level of animal use we may need to ensure that animal use and animal products have a higher explicit market price which reflects their true cost to society. Of course, there are other means of achieving the optimum level of animal exploitation – for example, by regulation that imposes level Q’. Moreover, institutional change may be necessary to bring such changes about. Policy instruments for improving animal welfare are considered further in Section 17.5.
Indeed, for a pragmatic or institutional approach the point of economic analysis is ultimately to inform an ethical and political discussion concerning institutional change. It is not to measure putatively optimal distributions, and an economist working in this tradition would be more sceptical about the suggestion that economics can identify the optimum level of animal exploitation. Existing consumer preferences reflect longstanding customs, not to mention considerable ignorance about both the needs of animals and the circumstances under which they are actually kept. This ignorance is itself complex and consists of a wide range of errors. For example, many consumers may idealize the conditions currently existing in livestock production, failing to recognize a dissonance with their own values. Others may overestimate the suffering of animals as they are currently kept or alternatively overestimate the relative benefits of alternative means of keeping animals. In either case, current consumer preferences merely reflect property rules and customary practices; they might be quite different under different rules or different histories. This does not imply that the study of latent consumer demand for animal welfare is unimportant from a pragmatic perspective. If a given configuration of market rules and practices provides little opportunity for consumers who would pay for more humanely produced animal products, the discovery and documentation of this latent demand contributes to a more thorough characterization of the problem definition.  What is more, such studies provide a basis for more accurately (if still imperfectly) predicting the likely consequences of a policy change that empowered choice based on these latent preferences. 
Whether one takes a conventional or an institutional view of why one is doing the economic analysis, the procedures that can be used to estimate the values of non-market goods, such as animal welfare, are the same (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). One of the most obvious ways is to ask people what something (usually referred to by economists as a ‘good’, which can be a product, policy or changed outcome of some kind) is worth to them. This is the basis of stated preference valuation methods such as contingent valuation and choice experiments, sophisticated survey techniques which present people with hypothetical market situations involving the good in question and then elicit their willingness to pay for the good. A conventional economist would elicit information from people on what they would be willing to pay for animals to be exploited (or not to be exploited) at different levels (thereby obtaining an estimate of the value they assign to animal welfare externalities) in order to determine the optimum level of animal exploitation for society. An institutional economist would interpret the same information not as evidence of the overall value to be assigned to animal welfare, but as a basis for predicting and understanding people’s behaviour. 
The institutional approach runs into an immediate problem in this respect, for it is well known that the response given to surveys seldom matches actual behaviour in the marketplace. The amount of willingness to pay for animal welfare measured in surveys is almost never observed when putatively welfare-friendly products are actually made available in markets. There are several possible explanations. It may be that people lack sufficient information regarding the animal welfare provenance of products in store or do not see/trust/understand the product labels or information provided. However, it may be more plausible to interpret these survey results as evidence for economic behaviour in the domain of political economy, rather than consumer choice. That is, responses to surveys more accurately reflect how people will behave in elections or other political situations than how they will make purchases in the grocery store. In this context, people may be responding more as citizens than consumers, and this may especially be true where a moral issue is perceived to be involved. Indeed, Bennett and Blaney (2002) showed that the greater the social consensus and moral imperative associated with an issue, the higher people’s willingness to pay to address the issue, suggesting that people were responding as citizens rather than consumers. Under such a scenario, people, as citizens, may support institutional changes that run contrary to the choices that they would make in consumer situations, if given the opportunity. Research suggests that some individuals may go so far as to engage in consumer choice with the intention of influencing political outcomes rather than satisfying personal preference (Lusk et al., 2007). This finding is somewhat inconsistent with the assumptions of the conventional economic paradigm, and suggests that certain economic behaviour may have a symbolic function that is not fully captured in the conventional understanding of cost benefit analysis.

17.5. Animal welfare policy instruments
The economic framework presented above helps to consider possible policy options for reducing the social costs associated with animal exploitation.
The UK’s Farm Animal Welfare Committee (FAWC, 2011, p21) has written:
Intervention by Government is of considerable importance to the protection of farm animal welfare. There are clear reasons for Government to intervene to safeguard and improve farm animal welfare, notably market failure, the existence of negative animal welfare externalities and provision of public animal welfare goods.
and (FAWC, 2008, para. 65):
Government intervention to protect animal welfare is necessary and ... legal minimum standards will always be required to ensure that animals are not treated cruelly or in ways that the majority of society finds unacceptable.
Furthermore (FAWC, 2009 p30, 31):  
Independent guardianship of welfare is needed to ensure that animals’ interests are safeguarded … guardianship should be independent of those with vested interests and should be the Government’s responsibility, acting in the public interest, [and] some would argue that the Government has not fully discharged its responsibilities as the guardian of farm animal welfare in the UK. 
Thus (FAWC, 2008, para. 67):
To achieve the levels of animal welfare that people want requires a co-ordinated approach to the use of policy instruments to achieve desired behavioural change (on the part of farmers, food retailers, consumers and other stakeholders, facilitated by Government).

Table 17.1 provides a broad categorisation of policy instruments with examples of their application to animal health and welfare and some assessment of their relative merits and limitations (see FAWC, 2008 for more detail). In practice, there is a host of different policy instruments that might be used to help protect or improve the welfare of animals. These policy instruments can be used singly or in combination with one another. It is clear that the market mechanism could be used, in theory, to achieve a level of animal exploitation closer to the optimum by appropriately pricing the exploitation of animals. This could take the form of either a subsidy or price premium for producers/products which are perceived as resulting in good animal welfare or a tax on producers/products which are perceived as resulting in animal suffering (for example, see FAWC, 2014 proposals for an Animal Health and Welfare Stewardship Scheme). Historically, governments have tended to intervene using legislation as the main policy instrument to protect or improve animal welfare (and this aspect is covered in some detail in the following chapter). However, comprehensive data have not been available to gain a clear idea of where the optimum level of animal exploitation might lie. Policy makers and others have rather put forward proposals concerning the level that they consider appropriate (often in terms of minimum standards), based on scientific evidence, moral beliefs and the political process.
McInerney (1994, p18) wrote:

If economic analysis is to extend beyond the drawing of diagrams which set out the conceptual basis for decisions on animal welfare standards, the task of research is to identify the structure and relative weight of those preferences in society if our notion of a social optimum is to be pursued. On the other hand, imposing a welfare standard institutionally by the establishment and enforcement of particular codes raises the question as to whose value function it claims to reflect.

This emphasises the need, in democratic society, not only to know the relationship between animal exploitation and animal welfare (the realm of animal welfare scientists) but also to know people’s preferences for animal welfare in order for government to set standards or intervene with other policy instruments to protect and improve animal welfare on society’s behalf. It would appear that a number of animal welfare charities feel that they cannot rely on governments to safeguard animal welfare. For example, Compassion in World Farming aims to ‘drive European legislation to achieve better standards of animal welfare through advocacy and campaigning’, whilst the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (founded in 1824) not only aims to ‘campaign for laws to be changed’ but also undertakes enforcement of laws by seeking prosecution of those who neglect or are cruel to animals (an action usually more associated with government and its agencies). For example, in 2015 the RSPCA investigated over 143 thousand complaints of alleged cruelty to animals, issued over 81 thousand pieces of advice and animal welfare notices and secured 1,781 convictions for animal cruelty in England and Wales (RSPCA, 2016).
Two issues are of clear importance in considering policy alternatives: the way in which standards are implemented within governance or regulatory structures, and the mechanisms for labelling food products that make animal welfare claims. With respect to the first issue, we use the term governance (as opposed to government) to indicate that while structures for regulating the types of production practice may be instituted by state agencies, there are non-state systems as well. The contrast between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) exemplifies this point. While the EU (as well as member states) has tended to address animal welfare concerns by legislative action that outlaws certain production practices, there is very little law in the US that mandates any practice, especially at the federal level (Matheny and Leahy, 2007). The pattern in the US has been the promulgation of voluntary standards (Blandford, 2013). In some instances, standards that, for example, mandate minimum space allowances or the provision of welfare amenities (such as perches or nest boxes for laying hens) have been developed by animal protection groups, while in other cases industry trade associations have been the key actors. Although industry-adopted standards seldom satisfy the demands of animal activists, they can be effective governance structures, especially when food retailers fall in line and announce the intention to stock only products that comply with these voluntarily adopted standards, (Thompson, 2015).
When standards are developed by animal protection groups, they are typically coupled with labels. This raises the second policy question: Who gets to say how labels will be implemented and governed? In the wake of numerous new claims appearing on food products, the US has developed a two-pronged approach. While the US Food and Drug Administration continues to exert oversight over health claims, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has adopted a ‘process verified’ for virtually all product claims that relate to the particular production process. This would, of course, cover claims concerning animal welfare, along with, for example, non-GMO (genetically modified organisms) or fair trade.  Put simply, process verified means that one can potentially say whatever one wants about a production process, as long as one can demonstrate to the satisfaction of USDA food marketing regulators that one has developed procedures to ensure that the claims are true. Within the US, standards for voluntary animal welfare labelling schemes have followed European research closely and often tend to mimic mandatory welfare standards that have been implemented in the United Kingdom (Swanson et al., 2011; Bergman et al., 2014). 
Although voluntary standards are the norm within the US, several US states have adopted broadly worded laws, often through direct ballot initiatives that amend the legal code through general elections. For example, in the 2008 election that brought Barack Obama to the White House, the State of California adopted a resolution (Proposition 2) prohibiting, with certain exceptions, the confinement on a farm of pregnant pigs, calves raised for veal, and egg-laying hens in any manner that does not allow them to turn around freely, lie down, stand up, and fully extend their limbs (Pacelle, 2015). The effectiveness of these ballot initiatives as regulatory measures is not yet clear: California Proposition 2 is being tested in the courts (McNabb, 2013). However, the co-existence of these multiple policy tools for addressing animal welfare within the US economy does provide an opportunity for analysis of their economic impact. Malone and Lusk (2016) estimate that California Proposition 2 has caused an increase in the price of eggs of between $0.48 and $1.08 per dozen as compared to markets that have not experienced the uncertainty associated with the need to comply with a state-based regulatory mandate. 
The next section presents a review of research aimed at eliciting people’s values and willingness to pay for animal welfare.

17.6. People’s willingness to pay (WTP) for animal welfare
Although widely used in other areas, stated preference valuation methods have not been very widely applied to the area of animal welfare.  Lagerkvist and Hess (2011) identified 24 stated preference studies of people’s WTP in relation to animal welfare, yielding 106 WTP estimates, in their meta-analysis of consumer WTP for farm animal welfare.  Approximately half of these are contingent valuation studies and half use a choice experiment approach (with one other using an experimental auction method). Additionally, Clark et al. (2016) observed just 17 WTP studies out of some 80 studies included in their systematic review of public attitudes, perceptions and behaviours towards animal welfare concerns arising out of livestock production diseases. Most studies relate to citizens or consumers in developed countries, especially Europe, although there are some in a developing country context such as Otieno and Ogutu (2015) who considered consumer WTP for chicken welfare in Kenya. Most studies are also concerned with farm animal welfare, although Bennett and Willis (2008) consider citizens’ WTP in relation to badger welfare in the context of bovine tuberculosis control in cattle in Great Britain and Zhao and Wu (2011) assess WTP in relation to zoo animal welfare in China.
What each of these studies has in common is that they all report that people express positive and often substantial WTP to protect or improve animal welfare. Another common feature is that they elicit WTP values from citizens regarding specific changes in husbandry or other practices to improve welfare, which means that a WTP study has to be undertaken every time an estimate of WTP is required. However, Bennett et al. (2012) present a method for the economic valuation of animal welfare benefits using a single welfare score which provides some valuation, in terms of WTP, that citizens give to different levels of animal welfare per se, regardless of the change in husbandry or other factors associated with those levels of welfare. Using this method, if animal welfare scientists can provide measurements of welfare status of animals on a similar scale, then the valuation can be applied to those measurements of different levels of welfare. Despite the attractiveness of such an approach, there remain both conceptual and practical difficulties. For example, people may have preferences in relation to different ways in which those welfare levels are brought about which would go unrecorded using the described approach. In addition, current methods of assessing welfare have tended to use a multi-dimensional framework with aggregation to a single measure or score of welfare status being problematic (not least because of the difficulties of trading off improvements in one dimension against reductions in another). For example, the Welfare Quality system of welfare assessment (Welfare Quality, 2017) involves 30-50 measures (for each production system) related to 12 welfare criteria in four areas – feeding, housing, health and behaviour – which can then be aggregated into one of four categories of welfare status: excellent welfare, enhanced welfare, acceptable welfare or not classified.




	Animal welfare and human welfare are inextricably linked. Economic analysis explicitly acknowledges this and considers the relationship between them.

	Economic considerations are central to the animal welfare debate and are integral, inescapable aspects of issues concerning the use of animals and of any interdisciplinary inquiry into animal welfare, alongside ethics, veterinary science and other disciplinary perspectives.

	Economic analysis is not merely a financial accounting exercise, but is capable of incorporating different ethical considerations and using information to make better decisions concerning human use of, and obligations to, animals.

	There is a clear economic rationale for government(s) to act as guardian(s) of animal welfare and to intervene on society’s behalf to protect the welfare of animals and deliver the levels of animal welfare that society wants. It could be argued that governments are not fully meeting their responsibilities and societal expectations as guardians of animal welfare.

	There is a range of policy instruments available to assist in this endeavour from legislation to the use of voluntary standards.

	Market forces can provide powerful incentives to improve welfare on a voluntary basis (with appropriate labelling) but the need for legislation will always remain. Institutional arrangements, such as independent animal welfare advisory bodies, are an important consideration in the required policy mix. 
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Table 17.1. Categories of policy instrument for protecting or improving animal welfare (adapted from FAWC, 2008).


Type of policy instrument	Example applied to animal welfare and health	Strengths	Weaknesses
1. Legal rights & liabilities 	EU Protocol on Animal Welfare	Self-help.	May not prevent events resulting from accidents or irrational behaviour.
2. Command & control	Minimum space rules for poultry.	Force of law.Minimum standards set. Transparent.	Costly. 	Inflexible.
3. Direct action(by government)	Welfare inspections.Border controls.	Can separate infrastructure from operation.	Danger of being perceived as ‘heavy handed’.
4. Public compensation/ social insurance	Compensation for animals slaughtered for welfare reasons.	Insurance provides economic incentives. 	May provide adverse incentives.Can be costly to tax payers.
5. Incentives and taxes	Cross compliance. Pillar II monies for farm animal welfare improvements.	Low regulator discretion.Low cost application.Economic pressure to behave acceptably.	Rules required.Predicting outcomes from incentives difficult.Can be inflexible.
6. Institutional arrangements	EFSA Sub-committee on Animal WelfareGB Farm Animal Welfare Committee	Specialist function.Accountability.	Potential for narrow focus of responsibility.
7. Disclosure of information	Reporting of notifiable diseases.Labelling.	Low intervention.	Information users may make mistakes.
8. Education and training	Animal welfare in veterinary education, national school curriculum.	Ensures education and skills required by society.	Can be too prescriptive and inflexible.
9. Research	Funding for animal welfare research (e.g. Welfare Quality)	Provide information to policy.	May duplicate or displace private sector activities.
10. Promoting private markets  a) Competition laws	 Market power of companies in the food supply chain and prices to farmers to meet production costs.	Economies of scale in use of general rules.Low level of intervention.	No expert agency to solve technical/commercial problems in the industry.Uncertainties and transaction costs.
b) Franchising and licensing	Veterinary drugs/treatments.Animal husbandry equipment.	Low cost (to public) of enforcement.	May create monopoly power.
c) Contracting	Hire of private vets to provide public services.	Combines control with service provision.	Confusion of regulatory and service roles. 
d) Tradable permits	Permits for intensive livestock production systems (e.g. the Netherlands).	Permits allocated to greatest wealth creators.	Require administration and monitoring.
11. Self regulationprivateenforced	(a) Farm assurance schemes, veterinary profession, industry codes of practice.(b) Member State enforcement of EU legislation.	High commitment.Low cost to government. Flexible. Enforcement ensures greater compliance	(a) Self-serving. Monitoring and enforcement may be weak.(b) Enforcement may be variable
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